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Spinoza, Bergson, Memory
(click)
Oh, look. Once again science has outdone itself with groundbreaking new research that finally affirms, three centuries after the fact, what philosophy has known since Spinoza - that mnemonic proximity is a function of duration and not of spacing. In other words, memories aren’t associated through the similarity of their ideatum - all our thoughts about “animals” in one place, all our thoughts about “plants” in another - but rather through their closeness in time.
In fact, the concept of memory that this article presents is virtually identical with the one put forth by Henri Bergson in Matter and Memory (1896). For Bergson, memory is a function of two factors: utility and capacity. Memory is, in effect, not so much an image as a particular duration of time, ranging from instantaneous to infinite, which contains within it a particular sequence of actions or affections and serving as a kind of “guide” for future action.

Spinoza, Bergson, Memory

(click)

Oh, look. Once again science has outdone itself with groundbreaking new research that finally affirms, three centuries after the fact, what philosophy has known since Spinoza - that mnemonic proximity is a function of duration and not of spacing. In other words, memories aren’t associated through the similarity of their ideatum - all our thoughts about “animals” in one place, all our thoughts about “plants” in another - but rather through their closeness in time.

In fact, the concept of memory that this article presents is virtually identical with the one put forth by Henri Bergson in Matter and Memory (1896). For Bergson, memory is a function of two factors: utility and capacity. Memory is, in effect, not so much an image as a particular duration of time, ranging from instantaneous to infinite, which contains within it a particular sequence of actions or affections and serving as a kind of “guide” for future action.